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The True Colours of Carbon 
The global strategic response to the challenge of climate change relies heavily on market 
mechanisms, and specifically on emission “offsets” generated by project activities in developing 
countries. There is, however, widespread uncertainty and scepticism about the value of carbon 
offsets1. Here we present a framework characterizing the nature of emission offset projects and 
outline policies that will help redirect market demand toward projects that provide greater 
climate change mitigation as well as socio-economic and ecological benefits. The majority of 
emission reduction projects are implemented through the clean development mechanism (CDM) 
established by the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). The CDM is intended to reduce emissions and promote sustainable 
development2. CDM projects operate within parameters stipulated in registered methodologies, 
and offsets are generated through projects registered with the CDM Executive Board. The 
international carbon market is growing rapidly, with over US$6.5 billion in project-based 
transactions in 2008 and total transacted value exceeding US$140 billion in 20093. CDM offsets 
serve as one of the primary means for firms in industrialized nations to achieve net reportable 
emissions reductions4, 5. The CDM has been criticized, however, for its lack of positive 
ecological outcomes and the disproportionate representation of certain project sectors and 
countries, and has arguably failed in its mandate to achieve sustainable development6-8. As a 
consequence, there is widespread uncertainty about the integrity of offsets and this has impeded 
progress in implementing effective climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. 
 
CDM project methodologies achieve reductions through avoidance, reduction, destruction or 
sequestration of emissions. Our framework assigns a colour label to each methodology which 
describes the nature of its carbon management. The analysis involved the application of the 
framework across 175 registered CDM methodologies and 6109 CDM projects in the CDM 
“pipeline”. Data was sourced from the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) Risoe 
Centre CDM Pipeline Database9. Brown methodologies represent improvements or efficiency in 
existing methods rather than innovation, and include decomposition and burial of captured 
emissions of industrial gases, energy efficiency, landfill gas capture, recovery of fugitive 
emissions, some fuel switching, cement production and CO2 capture. Red methodologies involve 
alternative development pathways including renewable energy provision from sources such as 
wind, solar and geothermal power, as well as some fuel switching and improved energy 
distribution systems. Green methodologies directly sequester carbon in vegetation by accreting 
new biomass. Blue carbon projects also involve sequestration, but in aquatic environments, and 
can increase carbon stocks in existing vegetation and soils as well as through production of new 
biomass. 
 
The majority of CDM methodologies are Brown and most projects are Red (Figure 1). While a 
tenth of methodologies are Green, there are only 60 Green projects, less than 1% of the total. Ten 
methodologies account for 77% of all projects in this analysis. Two of these, both involving 
electricity generation from renewable sources, account for nearly half of all CDM projects 
(23.8% and 23.4% respectively)9. There is a single Blue carbon methodology and one such 
project (currently at the validation stage) that involves mangrove afforestation in tidal wetlands 
around several small islands in Indonesia. There are as yet no methodologies featuring seagrasses 
or salt marsh vegetation. The supplementary information  
 
(Figure 1 here) 
 
It is estimated that by 2020 projects employing Brown methodologies will have generated 4.92 
billion certified emissions reductions (CERs) measured in metric tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalent (tCO2e), more than 60% of the total9. Red projects will have achieved reductions of 
nearly 3.14 billion CERs, almost 40%. In contrast, Green and Blue projects will have accounted 
for less than 76 million CERs, less than 1% of total emission reductions by 2020. There is a clear 
imbalance between the expected reductions from different project types, with Green and Blue 
projects significantly under-represented, which is anomalous given the importance of the ocean 
(over 70% of Earth's surface) and land-ocean-atmosphere feedbacks in the global climate 
system10. 
 
The absence of Blue carbon from the climate policy discourse is a striking deficiency, as the 
ocean is a dominant component of the global carbon cycle and more than half of all carbon 
accumulated in vegetation through photosynthesis is in marine organisms11. Vegetated coastal 
ecosystems including mangrove forests, salt marshes and seagrass meadows are immensely 
important ecological resources and largely unregarded. These areas provide vital ecosystems 
services including the provision of habitat, production of food, regulation of local climate and 
disease vectors, nutrient cycling and pollination, stabilization and protection of coastal areas and 
are highly effective carbon sinks11. Blue carbon projects not only generate these ancillary 
benefits but develop the adaptive capacity and social-ecological resilience of coastal 
communities that are likely to be disproportionately affected by the biophysical impacts of 
climate change12. 
 
The lack of effective policy responses to climate change and continued increases in emissions 
imply that impacts will continue to grow in frequency and intensity13, 14, 15. A realistic response 
to current projections recognizes that mitigation alone is no longer sufficient – adaptation is a 
necessity, particularly in developing countries and coastal zones. The most appropriate policy 
structures are those that incorporate emissions abatement and adaptive measures in coherent 
strategies to achieve a range of local sustainability outcomes. Project activities that generate 
offsets through sequestration of atmospheric CO2 while enhancing adaptive capacity should be 
considered more valuable than those that earn credits for avoidance of future emissions. 
 
The dearth of Green and Blue projects in existing international climate policy structures stems 
from practical and informational constraints, issues of leakage, data deficiency, cost-
effectiveness, permanence, and even charisma8, 16, 17. Perhaps the most significant constraint is 
the construct of permanence. Green and Blue offsets are currently considered temporary, and 
temporary CERs have restricted access in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and 
the Australian National Carbon Offset Standard. Red and Brown offsets are far more common as 
these types of projects provide a more attractive investment proposition than Green and Blue 
projects from a financial point of view, rather than from a public benefit perspective. Red and 
Brown projects generate larger quantities of emission reductions more quickly than do Green and 
Blue projects. 
 
If policy makers were to require firms covered by emission trading schemes to buy a certain 
proportion of their offset acquisitions from Blue and Green projects, then demand for such 
projects could be dramatically increased. If this happened, they would become comparable 
investment propositions to Red and Brown projects, because if demand exceeded supply, buyers 
would pay more, and perhaps be prepared to pay in advance for offsets from projects before they 
are sequestered. Other issues, like market-access restrictions due to perceptions of permanence, 
and market awareness or preparedness to investigate new types of offsetting options no doubt 
also have a major influence. 
 
These challenges should be addressed, as Green and Blue projects address the widest range of 
sustainable development priorities and contribute most to developing the adaptive capacity of 
communities directly threatened by the impacts of climate change. Green and Blue projects are 
likely to achieve real and significant emissions reductions, protect and enhance ecological 
systems and biodiversity, promote social sustainability by improving resource security and 
livelihoods, offer protection from geophysical climate change impacts, and contribute to the 
overall resilience and adaptive capacity of threatened human communities and biological 
systems. Greater amounts of investment need to be directed toward Green and Blue offset 
projects to facilitate their expansion and foster the benefits which result from ecological 
protection and restoration. 
 
The need for effective mitigation and adaptation strategies is becoming increasingly urgent14. 
There are efforts to improve the uptake of Green and Blue projects through voluntary 
accreditation schemes but these play a minor role in the carbon marketplace3, 18, 19. Pricing 
carbon remains a contentious issue in some industrialized countries, yet appears to be inevitable, 
and at present there are political opportunities to reform the existing regulatory system (centred 
on UNFCCC initiatives, and the domestic climate policies of wealthier nations), which has 
admirable intentions but is not achieving its goals. Those charged with the design of cap-and-
trade emissions trading schemes, or related carbon pricing schemes in Europe, the USA, Japan, 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia have an opportunity to invigorate investment in Green and 
Blue offset projects, encouraging the wide range of environmental and social benefits these 
generate. Policy-makers should endorse Green and Blue projects as preferential methods for 
offsetting as these types of projects offer significant value in terms of carbon sequestration, 
ecological resilience and social adaptation to climate change. Redirecting investment in this way 
would help to overcome many of the constraints on the development of Green and Blue projects 
including delayed revenue returns and burdensome transaction costs. There are many ways this 
endorsement can be achieved, including through the establishment of quota systems and 
differential pricing20, 21. 
 
At the same time, firms should be required to declare the colour of their offset acquisitions in 
public reports. This will facilitate stakeholder understanding and more accurately reflect 
corporate social responsibility. The widespread adoption of this framework may also reshape the 
role of intermediaries (such as banks) in the CDM market. Intermediaries have featured 
prominently in the growth of the market to date, and while this has provided necessary liquidity, 
offsets have been commoditised to the detriment of mitigation and sustainability outcomes. The 
bundling of offsets of all types for the purposes of price risk mitigation has benefits for business 
cost management but does little to promote the fundamental objectives of the CDM. The 
framework does not exclude the use of these types of financial instruments – offsets of particular 
colours could still be bundled – but it does entail their reform. The diminution of the role of 
intermediaries may also lead to greater proportions of offset profits being shared by buyers and 
project originators, including host country parties. 
 
All carbon is not created equal. Our policy choices and market mechanisms should begin to 
reflect this fact. 
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Supplementary Information is linked to the online version of the paper at 
www.nature.com/nature. The Supplementary Information file comprises a table which provides 
details of the application of the framework to the 175 registered CDM methodologies for the 
implementation of offset projects. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1: Analysis of CDM methodologies and projects using the Colours of Carbon framework. 
 
“Registered” projects include those that have already been issued with certified emissions reductions and 
those that have not; “In Process” includes projects  requesting registration, under review, or that have had 
reviews or corrections requested by the CDM Executive Board; “At Validation” includes projects being 
assessed by Designated Operational Entities; “Rejected” includes projects rejected by the CDM Executive 
Board, withdrawn by project developers, and projects that have been rejected or terminated in the 
validation process by Designated Operational Entities. Some of the 6109 projects employ multiple 
methodologies. In these cases the Colour is assigned based on the principal methodology of the CDM 
project. 
 

